We study a prototypical class of exchange economies with private information and indivisibilities. We establish an equivalence between lottery equilibria and sunspot equilibria and show that the welfare and existence theorems hold. To establish these results, we introduce the concept of the stand-in consumer economy, which is a standard convex, finite consumer, finite good, pure exchange economy. With decreasing absolute risk aversion and no indivisibilities, we prove that no lotteries are actually used in equilibrium. We provide a simple numerical example with increasing absolute risk aversion in which lotteries are necessarily used in equilibrium. We also show how the equilibrium allocation in this example can be implemented in a sunspot equilibrium.
Introduction
There is considerable empirical evidence that, unlike in the standard complete markets model, individuals bear substantial idiosyncratic risk. See Kreuger [18] for a survey and discussion. Both incomplete markets models, such as those of Geanakoplos [13] , and models of individual rationality constraints, such as those of Kehoe and Levine [15, 16] , Kocherlakota [17] , and Alvarez and Jermann [1] , have been used to study idiosyncratic risk bearing. None of these models can explain a strong concentration of individual portfolios in a narrow range of assets. Why, for example, does Bill Gates hold largely Microsoft equity, or does a car dealer's portfolio consist largely of the dealership's inventory? While individuals with such undiversified portfolios are a small fraction of the population, they hold a large percentage of wealth.
Moral hazard is an obvious explanation for such undiversified portfolios, and recently there has been a resurgence of interest in introducing this feature into general equilibrium theory. Bennardo [3] , Bennardo and Chiappori [4] , and Bisin and Guaitoli [5] have been such efforts. The point of departure has been Prescott and Townsend [19, 20] , who introduce both the idea that incentive constraints can be introduced into general equilibrium theory in a sensible way and the idea that lotteries play a potentially important role in the resulting theory. Although their theory has been widely used to study indivisibilities in the aggregate economy by Hansen [13] , Rogerson [22] , Cole and Prescott [9] , and others, until recently little effort has been made to study incentive constraints from this point of view. 2 The idea of using lotteries to study asset markets remains controversial.
This paper studies a prototypical class of incentive constrained environments in an effort to clarify a number of issues. One issue is how lottery equilibria are to be implemented. In the indivisibility case with a finite number of households, Shell and Wright [23] show that there is a close connection between lottery equilibria and sunspot equilibria, a connection that is made tight in Garratt et al. [12] . 3 Here we show that 2 A recent exception is Prescott and Townsend's [21] model of the firm. 3 Shell and Wright [23] consider a model with complete information and a continuum of consumers. They show that every lottery equilibrium allocation can be decentralized as a sunspot equilibrium. In a model with complete information and a finite sunspot state space, Garratt [11] shows that, while every lottery equilibrium allocation can be decentralized as a sunspot equilibrium, not every sunspot equilibrium allocation is a lottery equilibrium allocation. Garratt et al. [12] establish the equivalence, in general similar results hold in the case of incentive constrained economies with a continuum of households. In the important case of decreasing absolute risk aversion and no indivisibilities, we show that lotteries are not actually needed in equilibrium. We provide a simple numerical example with increasing absolute risk aversion in which lotteries are necessarily used in equilibrium. We also show how the equilibrium allocation in this example can be implemented in a sunspot equilibrium. The proofs of theorems, the analysis of the example, and the computation of equilibria in these sorts of economies are greatly facilitated by the notion of the stand-in consumer economy. Overall, we argue that the Prescott and Townsend framework represents a sensible and useful framework for analyzing moral hazard and adverse selection in general equilibrium theory.
In recent related work, Cole and Kocherlakota [9] consider an environment like ours with private information over endowments. They show that, if storage is possible and unobservable by other households, then the equilibrium allocation is the same as that in an economy with an incomplete markets economy with a single asset that pays the same in all states.
A Simple Insurance Problem
There is a continuum [ while the endowment of good 2 is fixed at Z 2 .
Viewed in the aggregate, after the state is realized, half of the population has the good endowment, and half the bad endowment. After the state is realized, there are gains from trade, as the bad endowment households want to purchase good 1 and sell good 2.
Before the state is realized, there are additional gains from trade since households want to purchase insurance against the bad state. In fact, since all households are ex ante identical and utility is strictly concave, the best symmetric allocation is that in which households complete information economies, of the set of lottery equilibrium allocations and the set of sunspot equilibrium allocations based on a continuous sunspot randomization device. + of good 1, and Z 2 of good 2. Following the mechanism design literature, we refer to this allocation as the first best.
Suppose that the realization of the idiosyncratic risk is private information known only to the individual household. In this case, the first best allocation is not incentive compatible. In the first best allocation, bad endowment households receive an insurance payment of ( ) / ω ω 
If this constraint is satisfied, the good endowment household has no incentive to lie about its private information.
We now establish that, if trading in insurance contracts is prohibited, there are incentive compatible gains to allowing this trade. Let ( , , , )
denote net trades by a household in an equilibrium in which trading in insurance contracts is prohibited.
Since a bad endowment household cannot imitate a good endowment household, it faces no incentive constraints. Since the good endowment household could have purchased the net trade of the bad endowment household and had income left over, it strictly prefers its own net trade to that of the bad endowment household,
We already know that (~,~,~,~) ( (
the equilibrium trades of insurance if there were no incentive constraints and would yield strictly higher ex ante utility than ( , , , )
because utility is strictly concave.
Consider the net trade
If θ is small enough, then good endowment household still has no incentive to misrepresent, but ex ante utility is strictly higher. Therefore, there are additional incentive compatible gains to trade that are not realized when trading in insurance contracts is prohibited.
Suppose, more generally, that households trade goods contingent on announcements. No household will ever deliver a bundle that is not incentive compatible.
Every household knows this fact, and so only incentive compatible bundles can be traded.
Notice, however, that this stronger argument does not guarantee that all incentive compatible bundles actually can be traded unless these contracts prohibit ex post trade: If a good endowment household can receive an insurance payment by claiming a bad endowment and then turn around and trade the insurance payment of good 1 for additional units of good 2, it will prefer this to admitting a good endowment. The contract must specifically prohibit households claiming to have a bad endowment from trading good 1 for good 2.
Contracts that preclude other trade are often referred to as exclusive contracts.
Contracts of this type are common in insurance markets. Often insurance contracts specify that the insurance payment can be used only for a specific purpose, such as replacing a structure on a specific location. We consider only exclusive contracts in this paper.
Let X denote the space of all net trades that satisfy the incentive constraint. Our program is to restrict households to trading plans in X and then do ordinary competitive equilibrium theory. 
For these two reasons, once we introduce incentive constraints into general equilibrium, we also introduce lotteries. We assume that households can contract for delivery of goods contingent on the sunspot and the individual state of the household. 5 We Consequently, a set of feasible reports must satisfy two assumptions:
The second assumption requires that it is not possible to report a net trade set that is infeasible with respect to the true net trade set. This assumption rules out more complicated possibilities, such as situations where the feasibility of trading plans can only be discovered ex post and punishment imposed for violating contracts. In such a case, feasible reports would depend on the particular contract offered. 
A caveat to the results reported in this paper is that efficiency is conditional on a particular set of feasible reports.
A sunspot contingent trading plan
We do not assume that X s i is convex or that u s i is concave or non-decreasing. We do assume: With the exception of the boundary condition, these assumptions are self-explanatory.
The boundary condition requires marginal utility to asymptote to zero; it says that eventually utility increases slower than any linear function. 7 9
An important fact about the non-satiation condition is that it implies non-satiation for incentive compatible net trades. • Households do not care about the private information of rival households. This assumption could be relaxed, but it would then be necessary to allow contracting based upon the announcements of the relevant rivals.
• We have implicitly assumed that contracts are exclusive -that is, that trading is not possible after deliveries are made. As we noted in the example, equilibrium with nonexclusive trading is quite different than with exclusivity. As pointed out by Prescott and Townsend [19] , the welfare theorems can fail without exclusivity. 
The utility function for net trades is derived from the utility of consumption according to
.
The feasible reporting sets reflect the fact that X X b g
There is one incentive constraint, corresponding to a good endowment state reporting a bad endowment:
Equilibrium with Sunspots
A sunspot allocation is a measurable map for each type from households to individual trading plans; that is x h X Notice that this definition incorporates public free disposal; we do not assume individuals can secretly dispose of goods. We say that an allocation has equal utility if for each type 
and the incentive constraints
transfers themselves must satisfy the equal treatment condition that they depend only on types:
A sunspot equilibrium is a sunspot equilibrium with transfers in which the transfers are zero:
Finally, a sunspot allocation is Pareto efficient if there is no alternative socially feasible allocation satisfying the incentive constraints in which almost all households have no less utility and a positive measure of households have strictly more utility.
An immediate consequence of the fact that the transfers satisfy the equal treatment condition is the conclusion that the equilibrium allocation must be an equal utility allocation. If it were not, then a positive measure of type i could increase their utility by switching to a consumption plan used by others of the same type.
Lemma 4.1 A sunspot equilibrium allocation with transfers is an equal utility allocation.
Our main goal is to establish the main theorems of competitive general equilibrium theory for the sunspot economy 
Theorem 4.4 (Existence Theorem)
There is at least one sunspot equilibrium.
The first welfare theorem is a relatively direct consequence of the non-satiation assumption and the standard proof of the first welfare theorem. The remaining results follow from equivalence theorems below.
Equilibrium with Lotteries
A probability distribution µ s i over X s i is referred to as a lottery. We define Notice that with a continuum of households we need not distinguish between realized and expected net trades. This distinction is important in decentralizing lotteries in the indivisible case with a finite number of households, as can be seen in the work of Garratt [11] and Garratt et al. [12] .
To illustrate our notation we apply it our insurance example. In the example, there Notice that in this formulation, lotteries are priced according to the aggregate resources they use. This is a no-arbitrage condition: two lotteries that use the same aggregate resources must have the same price. If one lottery uses aggregate resources y and another y, and if the cost of buying y and y separately exceeds the cost of buying y y + , it would be profitable to buy the joint lottery y y + and sell the pieces, while in the opposite case, the pieces should be bought separately, then packaged and sold. Only 9 We could have equally well followed the formalism of defining a trade vector µ µ µ = ( ,..., ) is incentive compatible by (a) and yields strictly more utility than µ i . As α approaches 0, however, the aggregate resources used by this set of lotteries approach y i and, therefore, for α sufficiently small, are less than ỹ i .
;
10 Much of the literature on lotteries studies production economies in which firms can repackage lotteries into different lotteries using the same resources; what we refer to as a no-arbitrage condition follows in that setting from profit maximization by firms. Our approach follows Hansen [1985] .
We will establish the main theorems of competitive general equilibrium theory for the lottery economy, as well as the sunspot economy. In Prescott and Townsend [20] , these theorems are proved directly; we give alternative proofs below. Our results on sunspot equilibria then follow from showing that lottery and sunspot allocations are equivalent. This lottery can be implemented in many ways by means of sunspots. For example, we could imagine that the individual lotteries are independent, 11 and that in the aggregate the strong law of large number leads to social feasibility. An alternative formulation would be to have a simple sunspot allocation in which when the sunspot variable satisfies σ ≤ 1 2 / , the first type receives all the cars and, when σ > 1 2 / , the second type receives all the cars. From an individual point of view it makes no difference which of these methods is used to allocate cars. 11 Subject to usual caveat about a continuum of independent random variables; see the discussion above. The possibility of prices q( ) σ that vary with the sunspot σ arises because there is more that one constant price vector that can support an allocation. Notice, in our example, that the mean price q = ( / , / ) 1 2 1 2 is also an equilibrium price. In Theorem 6.2, we prove that this is true in general. In our example, in which the role for sunspots arises because of indivisibilities, the possibility of more than one constant price vector supporting an allocation is degenerate in that it disappears if we perturb the endowments. In economies where the role for sunspots arises because of incentive constraints, however, there is no need for equilibria with more than one supporting price to be degenerate.
Sunspot Equilibrium versus Lottery Equilibrium
We define a sunspot allocation to be equivalent to a lottery allocation if for each type the mean set of lotteries of the sunspot allocation is equal to the corresponding set of lotteries in the lottery allocation. We define sunspot prices to be equivalent to a lottery price if the mean price of the sunspot prices is equal to the lottery price. By definition, there is only one lottery allocation and price that is equivalent to a given sunspot allocation and price function. As we have already noted, however, there is not a unique way to construct a sunspot allocation (or prices) from a lottery allocation. Nevertheless, there is one important construction that plays a key theoretical role in moving from lottery economies to sunspot economies. For a given lottery price p we define the constant function q p ( ) σ = to be the canonical sunspot price function 13 . For a given lottery allocation µ we define the canonical sunspot allocation to be a particular allocation in which the aggregate resources used by each type are independent of the sunspot state.
Specifically, corresponding to the lottery µ s i is a random variable ~( ) x s i σ . Recall that 13 Garratt et al. [12] call these prices constant probability adjusted prices. They show that in economies with complete information all sunspot equilibrium allocations can be supported by prices that are collinear with probabilities if the sunspot randomization device is continuous. a b mod is the remainder of a divided by b. We define the canonical sunspot allocation as
14 Notice that at this canonical allocation, the aggregate net trades by all households of a type is independent of the realization of the sunspot.
These simple constructions show that for every lottery allocation and price there is at least one equivalent sunspot allocation and price. Because the construction of the lottery allocation preserves utility, social feasibility and the incentive constraints, we can draw an immediate conclusion about Pareto efficiency. 
The Stand-in Consumer Economy
We now prove the welfare theorems and the existence of an equilibrium. From the equivalence of the sunspot and lottery equilibria, it is sufficient to do so in either of the two types of economies. Each approach, however, poses its own complications. The sunspot economy has a net trade set that is complicated and non-convex. The lottery economy has a net trade set that is convex but infinite dimensional. One approach is that of Prescott and Townsend [20] , which is to work directly with theorems for infinite dimensional economies. The alternative pursued here leads to finite dimensional and mathematically simpler proofs by observing that the household problem of maximizing utility subject to a budget constraint can be broken in two parts. The first part, since the cost of a set of lotteries is simply the cost of the expected net trades it uses, is to think of the household as purchasing an expected net trade vector. The second part is to think of the household as choosing the set of lotteries that maximizes utility subject to this expected net trades constraint. This utility depends only on the expected net trade vector, which is finite dimensional, so in effect reduces the economy to a finite one. 
This construct will be most useful if we can replace the sup with a max, so that there is at least one lottery that actually yields the utility U y i i ( ). ,µ be the points and probabilities in this sequence. This has a convergent subsequence on the extended real line. Because X s i is bounded below, any component of x s i that converges to ∞ has corresponding probability converging to zero. By the boundary condition the limit of expected utility for such a point is also zero. So the limit set of lotteries places weight only on finitely many points, and gives the same utility and satisfies the feasibility and incentive conditions. It is the optimal set of lotteries.
;
We now study trade in the economy, by considering I consumers with utility functions U i and consumption sets Y i . We refer to consumer i as the stand-in consumer, as he represents all households of type i. The stand-in consumer makes purchases on behalf of the ex ante identical households he represents, then allocates the purchases to individual households by means of an optimal lottery. Notice the role played here by the assumption that all households of a given type are ex ante identical: there is no ambiguity about how a lottery should be chosen to allocate resources among individual households.
In Conversely, given a stand-in consumer equilibrium , y p, we can use Lemma 7.1 to find for each stand-in consumer an optimal set of lotteries µ i , and it is clear that , µ p are a lottery equilibrium.
To prove the welfare and existence theorems for the sunspot economy and lottery economy, it suffices to prove them for the stand-in consumer economy. As this is a finite dimensional pure exchange economy, this follows from verifying standard properties of utility functions and consumption sets. 
Exclusivity and Incentive Constraints
We have already pointed out that incentive constraints demand exclusivity of contracts: although households of a particular type are ex ante identical, ex post they realize different values of the idiosyncratic shocks, and would want to trade with one another. The use of sunspots or lotteries introduces another dimension in which households are ex post different: even households who realize the same idiosyncratic shock will have different ex post net trades, as some win and some lose in the lottery.
This raises the question of whether even households with the same idiosyncratic state will want to trade in equilibrium. The answer is that, in the absence of incentive constraints, for example, when there are indivisibilities, households do not want to trade.
Consequently, it is only in economies with incentive constraints that we require exclusivity.
For simplicity, we limit attention to lotteries that have countable support. This will be the case if the consumption sets are discrete, as they may be with indivisibilities.
From the proof of Lemma 7.2, we also know that for any lottery equilibrium, there is another lottery equilibrium yielding exactly the same utility and with each type consuming the same aggregate resources, in which the support of the lottery is finite. The result we prove holds more generally, but the proof of the most general case is more technical. 
Risk Aversion and Lotteries
While in principle lotteries may be useful when there are incentive constraints, in many practical examples, equilibrium lotteries are degenerate. This is not a necessary conclusion: Cole [7] gives a robust example in which lotteries are used to sort high marginal utility from low marginal utility states. Cole's example has the odd feature, however, that the high marginal utility households, who we would generally think of as having low endowments, are less risk averse than low marginal utility households. In this section, we show that in the more plausible case of decreasing absolute risk aversion, equilibrium lotteries are in fact degenerate.
We now specialize to the case of an economy in which there are no indivisibilities. We assume that each household of type i in state s has an endowment of This says that the certainty equivalent is an increasing function of consumption, or equivalently, that the risk premium is declining. It is straightforward to check that in the case of a single good, this is equivalent to the usual definition.
We will show that, if (for all types) preferences are state independent and exhibit non-increasing absolute risk aversion, then there is always an equilibrium with degenerate lotteries. It is convenient to prove this using a weaker condition that does not require state independent utilities. 
This is a linear program that can be solved on any grid { } x sξ . Lemma 5.1(c) says that there will be a solution that places weight on at most 4 different points for each µ s . As the grid is refined, the set of approximate solutions will approach the set of exact solutions to the problem; if the original grid is carefully chosen, it is be possible to find an exact solution on the grid. Notice that this is the general sort of linear programming problem that we need to solve to find the optimal lottery allocation for a household type in the stand-in consumer economy. In the general case, there are J resource constraints, which replace the 0 on the right-hand side with y j i , and k i incentive constraints.
To have non-degenerate lotteries requires increasing absolute risk aversion. A convenient family with this property is that of quadratic utility functions. Consider the quadratic utility function between +7 and -5, however, and the well-endowed household prefers to avoid this risk.
There are multiple solutions to this example. For example, µ g ( )
9 9 32 7 9 32 = = − = is also a solution.
To verify that all solutions to our example involve non-degenerate lotteries, we provide a sufficient condition under which a non-degenerate lottery improves welfare, so that the solution to the stand-in consumer problem will necessarily be non-degenerate. If there is only one good, then the only degenerate lottery that satisfies the incentive constraint and does not lower welfare is autarky: µ µ 
where, to maintain social feasibility, we require that
The incentive constraint holding exactly can be written
To second order, this constraint can be written approximately as A second order Taylor series expansion allows us to approximate the ex ante utility of a small lottery that satisfies the incentive constraint as a function of its mean:
Differentiating with respect to x , we find
If this expression is strictly positive, as it is in our numerical example, then introducing a small lottery with a positive mean and a variance just large enough to make the incentive constraint hold increases welfare. Consequently, the degenerate lottery cannot be the solution to the stand-in consumer problem, and a non-degenerate lottery must be used in equilibrium.
It is worth pointing out two features of this example and our calculations. 
which says that if utility exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion,
then it is impossible for V' ( ) 0 to be positive. Even if there is increasing absolute risk aversion, however, there may not be non-degenerate lotteries: for this, increasing absolute risk aversion is necessary but not sufficient. Second, notice that, if utility is quadratic, then the formula we obtain for V x ( ) is exact, and not just a good approximation for small lotteries. In fact, it has been by maximizing this function that we have obtained the which limits how small we can choose π b , making clear that increasing absolute risk aversion is necessary but far from sufficient for non-degenerate optimal lottery allocations.
We can use our numerical example to illustrate some issues related to sunspot 
Ex Ante Lotteries
We have studied a model in which sunspots occur after households announce their state. From Cole [7] we know that the model in which sunspots occur before households announce their states is quite different. The more general case allows for both types of 
